A central bank revolution on climate change policy parallel to the 2015 Paris Agreement on steps to limit global temperature increases in this century may be under way, to achieve the essential collective carbon neutrality goals. In 2015 Mark Carney, governor of the Bank of England, warned of a series of climate change-related risks to the financial sector which could result from the process of adjustment towards a lower-carbon economy. A new organisation, the Network for the Greening of the Financial System (NGFS), was announced by eight central banks and supervisors in December 2017, growing to 46 by September 2019. The world’s central banks can and should set incentives to penalise carbon polluters and support the transition to a carbon-neutral economy. Empirical evidence demonstrates changing incentives are effective in changing investment behaviours.

Attacks on experts and professionals using available facts, are rising in the USA, with troubling implications for economics, for the collection of statistical data, and for the future integrity of the policymaking process. The Trump Administration is undermining fact-based decision making in a number of discreet interventions: Citizenship questions for the upcoming decennial census and in attacks on the work of an economist in the US Congressional Budget Office on healthcare costs. In Argentina from 2002 until 2015 the Kirchner government twisted the output of the official statistical agency to their own aims, publishing bogus data on inflation, GDP, and poverty. In Greece the efforts of Andreas Georgiou from 2010 to 2015 to correct the biased output on GDP and government expenditure data at the Greek Statistical Agency led a judicial persecution all the way to the Greek Supreme Court.

Seventy years of American leadership of the international system has ended abruptly shaking the foundations of the post-World War II international architecture. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, twin pillars of the post-World War II system, will be adversely impacted by an America First policy since the US has the largest share of votes, the loudest voice, and greatest influence in both institutions. The WTO dispute settlement system needs a minimum of four judges to function, but the U.S. Administration may opt to stymie the operation of this key pillar in global free trade with wilful neglect. It remains essential, therefore, that the Financial Stability Board created in 2009 is not impacted by the Trump Administration’s sceptical view of international regulatory coordination.

The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) pulled institutions together diplomatically and economically. It clarified options and failures of the past and hastened coordinated reforms. But the GFC also starkly illuminated another geopolitical dynamic: Deals struck in extremis must be adhered to after parties leave the negotiating table. Failure to do so can cause embarrassment, recriminations, and unintended consequences with long-term implications that run counter to the original aims and objectives of U.S. policymakers and reformers. This sequence of events played out with the long holdup of agreed International Monetary Fund voice and vote reforms, and the birth of the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank, which hastened the rise of China while weakening the role of the Bretton Woods institutions.

The 2007-2008 global financial and economic crisis precipitated a significant shift in the financial regulatory worldview (or paradigm) of political and central bank leaders from leading advanced and emerging states. With a common consensus on the required financial reforms, these actors moved swiftly to create a new organization. The Financial Stability Board (FSB) now stands at the centre of the global regulatory architecture, but it remains obscure, opaque, and closed to most external observers. The FSB needs to change as it matures to reflect its key role in global financial reform efforts.