This paper argues that the Bank of Japan’s decision in April 2013 to formally adopt inflation targeting as the framework of its monetary policy and to embark on a programme of quantitative and qualitative monetary easing was misconceived. The aim of the policy to achieve consumer price inflation of two percent on a sustainable basis has not been achieved. It is ill conceived because Japan’s deflation during the past two decades has been quantitatively small with evidence that a substantial part of this deflation is a statistical artefact. Furthermore, much of the fall in growth rates can be explained by a combination of a shrinking labour force and falling working hours. A large part of Japan’s fiscal deficits is structural, reflecting ballooning social security expenditure for the elderly which policy makers are unlikely to be able to reform. Weakening fiscal discipline implies that monetary policy in Japan is a de facto open monetization of government debt. When a crisis comes, the Bank of Japan will have no option but to continue financing government deficits even if the inflation rate climbs beyond its official target in the future.

Although Japan’s CPI is often criticized for potential upward bias, it deals with improvements in the quality of individual goods in ways that make the statistical inflation rate much lower than actual price changes. Moreover, the quantitative importance of this effect has risen progressively since the early 2000s due to increased weights of technology-intensive electronic products and changes in the method of adjusting their prices for quality improvement. Once this artificial effect is taken into account, it becomes questionable that Japan’s recent deflation has been so serious as to justify the adventurous monetary policy currently implemented by its central bank.

Among major advanced countries Japan stands out with its large-scale, one-sided exchange market interventions and enormous foreign exchange reserves. While the country’s exchange market activism is often attributed to its obsession with export-led growth, there are institutional reasons why such a policy remains unchecked. This paper discusses the problems of Japan’s Foreign Exchange Fund Special Account, their relationship with its exchange rate policy, and their implication for the international financial system.