Kimberly Ann Elliott

Kimberly Ann Elliott is Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC. She also holds a joint appointment with the Center for Global Development. She is the author or coauthor of numerous books and articles on a variety of trade policy and globalization issues. Much of her work focuses on the uses of economic leverage in international negotiations, including both economic sanctions for foreign policy goals and trade threats and sanctions in commercial disputes. She has coauthored two books on the costs of trade barriers in the United States and in recent years has turned to broader globalization issues, including the backlash against globalization, the role of developing countries in the trade system, international labor standards, and the causes and consequences of transnational corruption. Her most recent book is Delivering on Doha: Farm Trade and the Poor, which was copublished by the Center for Global Development and the Institute for International Economics in July 2006. Her other Institute publications include Can Labor Standards Improve Under Globalization? (2003), Corruption and the Global Economy (1997), Reciprocity and Retaliation in US Trade Policy (1994), Measuring the Costs of Protection in the United States (1994), Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (2nd ed., 1990), and Auction Quotas and United States Trade Policy (1987). She has also published in The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Current History, The Harvard International Review, and The World Economy, and has had opinion pieces in the Journal of Commerce, Washington Post, and New York Times, among others. She has testified before Congress on sanctions and corruption and, in 2002–03, served on the National Academies Committee on Monitoring International Labor Standards.

Papers Published in World Economics:

Agricultural Reform and Trade Negotiations

In this essay, Kim Elliott examines the patterns of support for agriculture across countries and commodities in the industrialized world. She then summarizes the approach to reducing trade-distorting support that came out of the Uruguay Round, and concludes with a discussion of the implications for reviving and successfully concluding the Doha Round.

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