During more than three decades of protracted high unemployment, European countries have developed a variety of approaches in order to tackle the problem. These strategies differ in their philosophy, scopes and successes. A number of them can be understood in terms of shying away from full-fledged liberalization in order to preserve the "European Social Model". In this paper the author discusses their relative merits. He focuses on strategies that may reasonably be expected to reduce unemployment, and ignores sheer blunders based on a false view of how the economics works (such as working time reduction), as well as measures that may improve the welfare of the unemployed but are nevertheless harmful to the labour market (such as generous unemployment benefits). The general message is that some of the strategies that “preserve the European Social Model” have merits, but are unlikely to lead to an efficient labour market where finding a job or hiring a worker are no longer considered as a painful challenge.

This paper discusses a number of issues in the context of the debate on intellectual property in less developed countries (LDCs). It starts by discussing the consequences of IP enforcement in LDCs for global innovation and welfare in poorer countries. It then considers the costs and benefits of IP enforcement for a small, open LDC, abstracting from global issues. Finally, it discusses the potential merits of an industrial policy based on open-source software. The analysis suggests that the view that it is best for LDCs to free ride on the global IP regime is overblown.

Labour market rigidities are often considered to be responsible for high unemployment in Europe. This paper outlines a theory explaining why they may be supported by the political system, and where their support comes from. Labour market rigidities are likely to arise as the outcome of microeconomic imperfections which allow incumbent employees to reap rents, and as a device to alleviate redistributive conflicts among groups of workers. Their support depends on the employed’s exposure to unemployment, the degree of underlying inequality in skills, and the responsiveness of employment to labour costs. It is shown that different labour market institutions, such as employment protection, wage rigidities, and unemployment benefits, may mutually reinforce each other, so that we expect to observe them together. Also discussed are implications for the timing and design of reform.