The paper reviews the arrangements for meeting additional post-crisis demand for international liquidity. It distinguishes between reserve creation and reserve pooling as a basis for multilateral liquidity facilities; reserve pooling arrangements carry the risk that, in a general crisis, all the members will want to draw at the same time. We analyse the recently agreed enlargement of the International Monetary Fund from this perspective, and conclude that the IMF will carry much more liquidity risk after its enlargement than it has done in the past.

The ‘credit crunch’ that began in August 2007 turned into a crisis when Lehman Brothers failed in September 2008. That event caused large international capital flows, including heavy repatriation of dollars to the United States. Central banks, led by the Federal Reserve, augmented the supply of international liquidity through bilateral central bank swap facilities, and thereby prevented the crisis from becoming much worse. We discuss the reasons for establishing swap facilities, the risks that central banks run in extending swap lines and the limitations to their utility in relieving liquidity pressures. We conclude that the credit crisis is likely to have a lasting effect on the international liquidity policies of governments and central banks.