The surviving legacy of the Long Term Capital debacle of October 1998 is an increased preference for liquidity among international investors. This process has a self-fulfilling element with liquidity following investors out of the less liquid markets and into the more liquid. A closer examination of this issue, however, suggests liquidity is not just an issue of size. There is some evidence that some markets have become bigger, yet thinner. In this paper the author focuses on the characteristics that can be used to better identify liquidity risk when a crisis hits.

In the international financial arena, policy makers chant three things: market-sensitive risk-management, transparency and prudential standards. The message is we do not need a new world order, just to improve the workings of the existing one. While many believe this is an inadequate response to the financial crises of the past two decades, few argue against this line. Perhaps more should. There is compelling evidence that in the short run, markets find it hard to distinguish between the good and the unsustainable, market players herd and contagion is common. In this environment, market-sensitive risk management and transparency can destabilise markets.