Andrea Prat

Andrea Prat received his PhD in Economics from Stanford University and is a lecturer at the London School of Economics and Tilburg University (Netherlands). He works on game theory and political economics. His current research focuses on the effects of lobbying on political decisions and on the role of campaign spending.

Papers Published in World Economics:

An Economic Analysis of Campaign Finance
Author: Andrea Prat

Electoral campaign finance is an important, and much debated, phenomenon in
democracies throughout the world. This article discusses a possible economic
model of campaign finance, which could be used for policy evaluation. At the
core of the model lies an asymmetry of information between lobbies and voters.
Lobbies know more than voters about the quality of candidates. Campaign
contributions constitute an indirect way to reveal lobbies’ information to voters.
However, this informational benefit comes at the cost of candidates deviating
from the median voter’s preferred policy in order to attract higher contributions.

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