China’s Capital Market
Better than a casino
• Author(s): Stephen Green
• Published: December 2003
• Pages in paper: 18
Abstract
Throughout the 1990s, China’s stock market was developed as a tool of industrial
policy. It was used to supply capital to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that
remained controlled by the state and whose performance usually declined after
listing. Secondary market trading was poorly regulated, again partly for political
reasons. As a result, the market has become infamous for extreme volatility, price
manipulation and grossly unreliable accounting. This is a problem for the
government since the stock market is ill-equipped to support the government’s
other increasingly important economic priorities. The government now needs to
improve the efficiency of industry in order to sustain employment creation, to
raise capital to finance its own liabilities and to put into place a modern pension
system. As a result, China’s stock market is being slowly reformed. Listed
companies are quietly being allowed to privatise. The regulatory framework has
been rationalised. The empowered China Securities Regulatory Commission is
pushing forward with a range of policies aimed at improving corporate
governance. Shareholders have been allowed to pursue civil compensation claims
against firms in the courts. Financial intermediaries are being privatised, the fund
sector is being rapidly expanded and foreign investors are gradually being
allowed in. These changes, although deeply unpopular among some important
groups, will mature the market over the next decade.
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