The concept of ‘currency wars’ has come into popular use in recent years. This article examines various meanings of the phrase and its historical antecedents. It goes on to discuss why currency wars have become the focus of attention and the economic policy weapons that may be used to conduct such wars. It draws attention to the collateral economic damage that may be caused by unleashing these weapons both for the individual countries that use them and for the world economy. The article concludes that, while there may have been occasional currency battles or skirmishes, the empirical evidence does not support the claim that there is widespread currency warfare. However, currency misalignment does exist and correcting it would help induce the international adjustment needed to reduce the global economic imbalances that threaten international financial stability. The problem is to find effective institutional arrangements for encouraging this to happen. Current proposals under discussion that envisage an enhanced role for the IMF and the G20 seem unlikely to be very successful.

In the sequence of currency crises in emerging economies in the 1990s, there was an observed reluctance to devalue the exchange rate. Although ultimately adopted, the decision to devalue was usually delayed, often until it could no longer be avoided. While economic explanations of delay are available, they need to be combined with an evaluation of the political implications in order to secure a better understanding of exchange rate inertia. This article presents a political economy interpretation of delayed devaluation. It introduces and discusses the determining factors drawing on available empirical evidence and briefly applies these ideas to a range of specific examples. It also examines why there may be even more impediments in the way of timely revaluation. Since delayed exchange rate adjustment carries economic costs, the article also considers ways in which delay may be minimised.

The IMF presents multilateral surveillance as one of its core responsibilities and has recently sought to enhance this role via a series of multilateral consultations with systemically important countries, designed to coordinate exchange rate and macroeconomic policy in order to reduce the global economic imbalances that threaten the stability of the international financial system. The authors examine the evolution of the IMF's multilateral surveillance and assess what it has achieved. They also investigate what may reasonably be expected from surveillance and, in the light of this analysis, evaluate the outcome of the multilateral consultations. Concluding that there are strict limits on what the Fund can achieve in terms of using multilateral surveillance to avoid economic and financial crises, they also explore areas relating to crisis management where the IMF might be able to make a more important contribution. The Fund needs to temper ambition with reality if it is to maintain credibility as an international financial institution.